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In the original 1895 preface to Jude the Obscure, Thomas 
Hardy offered a concise statement of the text’s purpose: “For a 
novel addressed by a man to men and women of full age; 
which attempts to deal unaffectedly with the fret and fever, 
derision and disaster, that may press in the wake of the 
strongest passion known to humanity, and to point without a 
mincing of words, the 
tragedy of unfulfilled 
aims” (38). Nearly 
thirty years later, in the 
preface to the 1912 
edition of Jude, Hardy 
quietly repurposed his 
novel. Where once the goal was to explore “the tragedy of 
unfulfilled aims,” it now offered, “to tell, without a mincing of 
words, of a deadly war waged between the flesh and spirit” 
(39). Suddenly, Hardy’s 1895 claim not to be mincing words 
starts to seem disingenuous; “unfulfilled aims” now feels like a 
cautious misdirection, shifting the primary focus of the novel 
away from Jude’s vexed sexual relationships with Arabella 
Donn and Sue Bridehead to his frustrated attempts to gain 
entrance into Christminster University (a thinly veiled stand-in 
for Oxford). It is as though the sexuality at the core of the 
novel had until now been hiding behind a pretence that the 
main conflict lay in Jude’s lack of social mobility. Certainly, we 
cannot ignore the looming presence of Christminster 
throughout the novel, but neither should we overlook the fact 
that we are less than one third of the way through when Jude 
reconciles himself to the impossibility of this dream. Read in 
this light, it can seem as though Hardy’s revision attempts to 
bring the true purpose of the novel to light, to reveal what he 
was heretofore unwilling or unable to admit: that his novel had 
always really been about the problem of regulating our desires, 
bringing our sexual urges in line with a society that was 
preoccupied with denying their very existence. It is certainly 
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true that Hardy used Jude the Obscure to enter into timely 
discussions of sexuality as part of the human experience. I will 
argue, however, that the novel does not so much try to 
obscure this discussion behind the Christminster plot, as it 
presents the two as inexorably linked. Simply put, Jude’s 
academic and romantic ambitions are embodiments of the 
same antisocial fantasy. 
By “antisocial” I do not mean that Jude thinks or acts in ways 
hostile to other individuals—although his unsanctioned 
ambitions certainly set him apart from society in a way that is 
continually perceived as hostile. Instead, I mean that he 
refuses to participate in the shared fantasies that stabilize 
interpersonal relations, establish ideological commonalities, 
and, from a psychoanalytical perspective, mask the traumatic 
impossibility of a complete social relationship. What makes 
Jude’s spiritual and sexual fantasies antisocial, is that both, at 
least tacitly, acknowledge the absence upon which all social 
fantasies are constructed; he recognizes Christminster and Sue 
Bridehead as unattainable phantoms, which is what attracts 
him to them. They insist upon sociality’s fundamental lack, 
denying the promise of future completion that underwrites all 
fantasy structures. Thus, the novel’s main tension is not so 
much between the flesh and spirit as between the social and 
the antisocial. Jude’s communities must ensure that these 
fantasies remain unfulfilled, because to fulfill them would be to 
threaten the social fantasy writ large and the ideological 
structures it maintains. 
Hardy scholars have written much on the reason for the above 
revision. Rosemary Sumner, in the first book-length study of 
Hardy as a psychological novelist, suggests that he made this 
change as a way of defiantly foregrounding his long-held, 
though never fully articulated, belief in “the sexual basis of 
much psychological disturbance” (3). Conversely, James 
Harding argues that Hardy’s revised preface was born of his 
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(ultimately ineffectual) attempt to retreat from controversy; it 
was but one element in a larger process of revision in which he 
attempted to excise much of the overt sexuality from the 
novel. Ironically, as Harding notes, Hardy’s plea for tolerance 
took on a peculiar character when read against the larger text: 
Although it remained with the manuscript, the plea 
expressed in the “Preface” was now obsolete. The need for 
it had been invalidated by Hardy’s own hand because “a 
mincing of words” in the form of significant revisions now 
skewed the “deadly war between flesh and spirit.” (87) 
Rather than seeing these proposed reasons for revision as 
oppositional—he is either foregrounding or backgrounding the 
novel’s sexuality—I suggest that we read them as 
complementary. That is, this curious choice that Harding brings 
to our attention, to simultaneously announce the novel’s 
sexuality in the preface while eliding it from the text, indicates 
a pervasive tension throughout the novel between Jude’s social 
identities as a scholar and a lover. Neither can exist in isolation 
from the other: they are part of a continuum. The fact that 
Hardy’s phrasings in the prefaces are nearly identical only 
serves to underscore this point. 
While Hardy claims to be working within a larger religious-
philosophical tradition that sets the spirit and the flesh in 
binary opposition to each other, the novel itself continually 
undermines this binary. In fact, nowhere do we see either the 
veneration of the spirit or the condemnation of the flesh. 
Instead, Hardy offers us an exploration of a society that is as 
invested in policing aberrant spirituality as it is in policing 
aberrant sexuality. Here I understand “spirituality” as an 
ideological construct no less materialist in its foundation than 
any other social institution, and I think Hardy would agree. 
Indeed, he takes pains to show his reader that Jude’s desire to 
attend Christminster is entirely secular. It is not based on 
some divine calling, but instead on Jude’s pre-existing status 
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as an outsider in the rural community of Marygreen. The 
fantasy, then, is constitutively aberrant since its inception is 
rooted in Jude’s antisociality. 
As Francesco Marroni observes, it is of no small significance 
that the novel opens as it does with the departure of Richard 
Phillotson, Jude’s schoolmaster, surrogate father, and the 
closest thing he has to a friend: “For a boy like Jude, who had 
in Phillotson his only friend and affective and cultural reference 
point, the parting implies an acute suffering and a first warning 
of the instability of human relationships” (164). In other 
words, the fantasy arises at the precise moment that Jude 
encounters sociality’s lack: the moment when he can no longer 
deny the impermanence of social relations. In psychoanalytic 
terms, this societal lack is to be understood not simply as an 
imperfection (imperfectability) in any external social structure, 
but, rather, a lack that exists first and foremost within the 
subject. This is what underlies Lacan’s principle, introduced in 
Seminar XX, that there is no sexual relationship; there is no 
way to experience another individual except through the 
prismatic lens of the symbolic order, which necessarily 
prevents us from experiencing each other (or, indeed, 
ourselves) except as vessels for some ever-elusive psychic 
surplus. Philloston’s departure from Marygreen enacts the 
primal fall, in which Jude is torn from the false promise of 
social relations and cast into the alienating order of the 
symbolic. It is at this moment that it becomes imperative for 
Jude to find that objet a—that ever-elusive piece of the “Big 
Other” which carries the social surplus that can never be 
satisfied. 
Importantly, Phillotson introduces Christminster as an elusive 
object. When Jude asks, “Why do you go, sir?” Phillotson 
replies, “You wouldn’t understand my reasons, Jude. You will, 
perhaps, when you are older” (46). Thus, Jude comprehends 
Christminster as a specter only, a city perpetually on the 
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horizon, calling to him along the wind, “We are happy here!” 
(59). In psychoanalytic terms, this insubstantiality is crucial 
because the objet a must never become too tangible. It must 
always remain at arm’s length because once it becomes too 
real it can no longer carry its social surplus. As Slavoj Žižek 
writes in Sublime, “we search in vain for it in positive reality 
because it has no positive consistency—because it is just an 
objectification of a void” (95). For Jude, then, Christminster 
becomes the ultimate objet a towards which his desires will 
always propel him, but which must always elude him. That he 
is continually denied entry into Christminster, by his fellow 
villagers when he is young and later by the institution itself, 
only serves to heighten its allure. 
When Philloston abandons Jude, he imbues Christminster with 
the surplus that he himself can no longer bear. He does not so 
much offer Christminster as an object for Jude’s desire as he 
offers Christminster as that which had always been this elusive 
object. As Jude realizes in the wake of Philloston’s departure, a 
Christminster education promises him that which he has 
suddenly desired all along: 
Jude continued his walk homeward alone, pondering so 
deeply that he forgot to feel timid. He suddenly grew 
older. It had been the yearning of his heart to find 
something to anchor on, to cling to—for some place which 
he could call admirable. Should he find that place in this 
city if he could get there? Would it be a spot in which, 
without fear of farmers, or hindrance, or ridicule, he could 
watch and wait and set himself to some mighty 
undertaking like the men of old of whom he had heard? 
(62) 
As Hardy demonstrates, there is nothing in Christminster itself 
that calls to Jude. Instead, Hardy emphasizes the fundamental 
arbitrariness of Jude’s spiritual aims. The fact that it had 
already been the yearning of Jude’s heart to find something, 
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and that Christminster just happened to fill the void, leaves us 
ample room to doubt whether it is a tragedy that these aims 
remain unfulfilled. 
As noted, Jude’s spiritual fantasy, his Christminster fantasy, is 
constitutively aberrant since it is rooted in Jude’s antisociality. 
I do not simply mean that it is antisocial to the extent that all 
fantasies are antisocial, since they necessarily mark sociality’s 
fundamental lack; rather, there is something in this peculiar 
fantasy that the Marygreen society finds threatening. It is not 
long before Jude’s private studies become off-putting for those 
in his rural community, which is manifested as a generalized 
alienation from a community that now regards him as “very 
stuck up, and always reading” (79). Jude’s apparent 
obliviousness to his community’s silent disapprobation only 
functions to escalate the intensity of its social regulation. In a 
very telling episode, his insistence on pursuing his scholarly 
aims while working (as Hardy notes, the only study time 
available) results in his community calling for police 
intervention: 
He was frequently met in the lanes by pedestrians and 
others without his seeing them, and by degrees the people 
of the neighbourhood began to talk about his method of 
combining work and play (such as they considered his 
reading to be), which, though probably convenient, was 
not altogether a safe proceeding for other travelers along 
the same roads…. [A] private resident of adjoining place 
informed the local policeman that the baker’s boy should 
not be allowed to read while driving. (69) 
While the neighbour’s concern is ostensibly that of public 
safety, there is little indication that anyone was all that 
concerned with Jude’s driving. The fact that he does not see 
pedestrians is initially regarded as a curiosity rather than a 
hazard. But eventually the community comes to recognize the 
fact of his not seeing them as a threat beyond the immediate 
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possibility of a collision. It indicates a larger non-alignment, an 
uppitiness that marks him as a social outsider and a threat. 
In his oft-cited introduction to the New Wessex edition, Terry 
Eagleton argues that Jude’s conflict with his native and 
adoptive communities is rooted in class ideologies. For 
Eagleton, Jude’s fantasy of becoming a Christminster scholar is 
disruptive because it entails moving beyond the confines of 
class limitations. It is not, he assures us, simply about moving 
upwards within capitalism; rather, it is about finding labour 
autonomy within such a heavily regulated economic system: 
“[Jude’s] place in Marygreen society ... is with the semi-
independent ‘tradesman’ class…. As a class, they offered a 
peculiarly intense focus for the disruptive social forces at work 
in the countryside” (37). Marygreen is not structured as a pre-
capitalist peasant village. In fact, it is the opposite. It is a 
formerly trades-based agrarian economy “stripped of its 
thatched and dormered dwelling-houses as the tradesmen, 
craftsmen and lifeholders move from the land” (Eagleton 37). 
Mobility alone is not threatening to the Marygreen community; 
in fact, mobility is becoming the norm. Arabella, for instance, 
freely moves across the country, and even back and forth 
between England and Australia, without social disapprobation. 
What makes Jude’s desire for mobility threatening is that he 
imagines scholarship at Christminster as a way of stepping 
outside capitalism altogether. Of course, this naïve fantasy is 
doomed from the start. As Eagleton notes, the bitter irony is 
that Christminster can only retain its phantasmal appeal by 
barring entry to tradesmen such as Jude, on whom it relies to 
maintain its crumbling edifice: “Jude’s labour-power is 
exploited literally to prop up the structures which exclude him” 
(39). In other words, neither Marygreen nor Christminster care 
where Jude moves so long as his labour remains bound by the 
structures of capitalism. While Eagleton’s analysis remains 
compelling, and certainly provides a convincing explanation for 
the university’s investment in barring him entry, it does not 
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adequately address the antisociality of Jude’s dream, nor does 
it fully explain why the Marygreen community—one that is 
used to losing its young tradesmen to larger urban centers—so 
adamantly opposes his Christminster fantasy. In order to 
understand this, we must look more closely at the peculiar (or 
better, queer) nature of the fantasy. 
Expanding upon methodologies set forth in Freud’s 
Interpretation of Dreams, Žižek writes that the key to 
interpreting any fantasy lies in the shape that the fantasy 
assumes: “the point is to avoid the properly fetishistic 
fascination of the ‘content’ supposedly hidden behind the form: 
the ‘secret’ to be unveiled through analysis is not the content 
hidden by the form ... but, on the contrary, the ‘secret’ of the 
form itself” (SOI 11, italics in the original). Along these lines, 
then, in order to properly understand the antisocial nature of 
Jude’s Christminster fantasy, we must examine the secret in 
the Christminster form that so captures Jude’s imagination. I 
have touched on some of the key elements of this form 
already. In the first place, as the Marygreen community is 
quick to recognize, Christminster is aloof. For all of Jude’s 
“spiritual” intentions, his daydreaming belies a self-serving 
motivation for becoming a Christminster scholar. He dreams of 
becoming a Doctor of Divinity, a bishop or archdeacon at least 
(73-74). While he imagines how he might return to better the 
community, the enjoyment of his anticipated snobbery is 
undeniable. As a wealthy member of the clerisy, he will stand 
above the poor inhabitants of Marygreen, paternalistically 
giving away £4,500 of his imagined £5,000 salary (73). The 
fact that he has no particular idea of where or how the money 
will be spent suggests that his charitable impulse is more 
firmly rooted in the desire to occupy the dominant end of a 
power imbalance than in the wish to interact in any meaningful 
way with the community. 
 141 
Pivot 2.1 
Perhaps more important to the form of Jude’s fantasy is the 
university’s ahistorical nature. Christminster is temporally 
phantasmal. It is neither of the here-and-now, but nor does it 
properly belong to any historical era beyond the nebulous “of 
old”. As Eagleton tells us, this temporal indeterminacy is 
significant because, lacking its own vitality, Christminster 
continually demands “nutriment from the labour of the living” 
to prevent its collapse (39); it becomes a perpetual-motion 
machine of class domination. However, psychoanalysis 
contributes another layer of significance. Because 
Christminster stands apart from history, it exists in a 
prelapsarian psychical period: it exists prior to the scene of 
primordial loss (the original “castration”) after which full 
sociality becomes impossible. The timelessness of 
Christminster renders it a site where subject is not yet barred 
by the intrusion of the symbolic and, returning to Lacan’s 
theory, the sexual relationship is not yet impossible. 
Paradoxically, however, this phantastic desire for a point of 
absolute sociality is at the same time a perverse re-staging of 
the primal castration. As Žižek writes, “Contrary to the 
common-sense notion of fantasizing as an indulgence in the 
hallucinatory realization of desires prohibited by the Law, the 
phantasmic narrative [... stages] the very act of its 
installation, of the cut of symbolic castration” (Plague 17, 
italics in the original). Jude recognizes as much when his 
fantasy first takes shape: “‘It is a city of light,’ he said to 
himself. ‘The tree of knowledge grows there.’” (62). Already, 
he imagines himself as an Adamic figure, at least partially 
aware that he is doomed to lose the very jouissance promised 
by the Tree’s forbidden fruit, or, more precisely, the erotic 
rapture that the fruit promises. 
Before I return to the erotic implications of this Edenic fantasy, 
I will first attempt to concretize the fantasy in terms of the 
novel. As noted earlier, Christminster emerges at the traumatic 
moment when Jude is confronted with the undeniable 
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instability of social relations: this is the fall. After this moment, 
all that is left is an unattainable surplus, which for the sake of 
simplicity we can refer to as jouissance.1 With Philloston gone, 
Jude transfers this surplus onto Christminster, rendering it the 
sublime object of his desire: this is the perverse re-staging. It 
is crucial to note that the re-staging is not a singular, discrete 
event that happens once and is completed: it can never be 
completed. Like Satan in Milton’s Paradise Lost, Jude’s fall 
must happen in perpetuity; he must fall “[t]en thousand 
fathom deep, and to this hour” (II 934). It is precisely for this 
reason that Jude’s perverse fantasy takes a form that must be 
prohibited. Jude needs the Law to intervene and tell him he 
cannot attend Christminster; he cannot be a scholar. It must 
be noted here that “Law” does not simply refer to judicial 
mechanism of the policeman called upon by the community of 
Marygreen to prevent his reading while at work (quoted 
above), nor of the policeman who harasses Jude while he 
admire the buildings of Christminster (116)—though both 
externalize the concept nicely. Instead, it refers to an internal 
mechanism of prohibition, that which regulates access to the 
objet a. Indeed, as Žižek writes “the object of desire is Law 
itself” (Plague 17, italics in the original). Finally, we reach the 
crux of the fantasy, which is that Jude desires prohibition. This 
is the first element that renders his fantasy properly antisocial. 
It is the very impossibility of the fantasy that drives Jude. It is 
the denial of the objet a from which he derives his jouissance. 
Or, to put it another way, his despair is his enjoyment. 
In her chapter on Jude the Obscure, Sumner takes pains to 
demonstrate that, contrary to standard readings of the time, 
Jude is a well-balanced and mainly resilient character: 
                                               
1 While Lacanian psychoanalysis does not figure “surplus” and jouissance 
as identical to each other, neither are they fully separable. Jouissance 
can only exist in relation to the subject’s proximity to the surplus. If the 
surplus is the heat of a candle, jouissance is the warmth on the hand 
that passes over it, or the burning when it comes too near. 
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In fact, until close to the end, he copes with both his own 
strong passions and ideas and with the external world in a 
resilient and tenacious way.... His loss of the will to live at 
the end seems a fairly reasonable reaction to the loss of 
everything that makes life meaningful to him. His 
disintegration is more the result of external pressure than 
of inner disturbance. (148) 
What Sumner fails to comment upon, however, is the 
frequency with which Jude falls into despair. It does not 
happen just once, at the end when his children have died and 
Sue has left him: it happens throughout. We see him 
disintegrate at the first sign of adversity, flinging himself down 
on his Latin reader when he first discovers that the words do 
not render themselves transparent to him (67). It is further 
telling that Jude’s immediate desire is for an impossible social 
intervention: 
Somebody might have come along that way who would 
have asked him his trouble, and might have cheered him 
by saying that his notions were further advanced than 
those of his grammarian. But nobody did come, because 
nobody does; and under the crushing recognition of his 
gigantic error, Jude continued to wish himself out of the 
world. (67) 
He longs for another person to tell him that he has already 
achieved his goal, but this is exactly what his fantasy was 
designed to preclude. We see that it is not, as Sumner asserts, 
“external pressure” that causes Jude to despair: it is the 
internal construction of the fantasy that regulates all social 
intervention, good or bad. The construct both maximizes 
external pressure and prevents the social world from helping 
him attain his goal. He can demand a social intervention only 
insofar as he knows that it will never happen: “Nobody did 
come, because nobody does.” Thus, the surplus remains and 
his jouissance is assured. 
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Another way to understand this process is in terms of the 
Freudian “death drive.” In the simplest terms, the death drive 
is that mechanism which regulates the homeostasis of our 
jouissance. As Freud conceives it in “Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle,” the death drive gives us “pleasure to the degree 
that it moves beyond a certain point towards complete 
stability, and unpleasure to the degree that it moves beyond a 
certain point away from that stability” (134, italics in the 
original). The death drive is not, as is frequently understood, a 
suicidal mechanism within our psyche. Quite to the contrary, it 
is that which demands that we continuously look to the 
horizon, that we pursue the chimerical object of our desire. 
The death drive ensures that we remain in this world by 
constantly reproducing our desire. In terms of Jude’s despair, 
the fact that “nobody does come” allows the drive to persist. 
There is nothing abnormal in this; however, there is a 
seemingly pathological short circuit in Jude’s particular fantasy. 
Whereas the typical fantasy orients our drive towards a 
positive object—an elusive something—Jude’s perverse fantasy 
orients his drive towards nothing. This is the second 
fundamentally antisocial feature of Jude’s Christminster 
fantasy. It denies futurity; or, rather, it denies the comforting 
illusion of futurity. 
Here I draw upon the recent work of Lee Edelman, who figures 
this denial of futurity as both sinthomatic and queer 
(Sinthomosexual, as he terms it). For Edelman, the Lacanian 
sinthome—the psychical apparatus that allows the individual 
access to jouissance, not by recognizing a lack in the “Big 
Other,” but by denying the very existence of the “Big Other” as 
guarantor of meaning—is fundamentally queer (and queerness 
is fundamentally sinthomatic) in that it is non-procreative. It 
refuses to participate in the reproduction of a future-oriented 
fantasy: it “refuses the Symbolic logic that determines the 
exchange of signifiers [and] admits no translation of its 
singularity” (35). To understand how Jude’s fantasy takes on 
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this Sinthomosexual character, we must consider the final 
crucial element in its form. As noted, Christminster is both 
socially aloof and temporally remote. Both of these partially 
reflect the most significant phantasmal characteristic of 
Christminster, which is that it is not (t)here. Christminster, as 
Jude first conceives it, is properly utopian in that it is “no 
place.” As Marroni writes of Philloston’s departure, “[t]he 
beginning in medias res has the function of actualizing the 
scene of a departure that means a separation from a place” 
(164). The point being that Jude actualizes the jouissance of 
his abandonment by attaching it to a place of which he cannot 
conceive except as separation. Jude’s nascent conception of 
Christminster as the site of absence is immediately solidified 
when—hoping to give a proper form to his fantasy—he climbs 
the farmer’s ladder to view Christminster with his own eyes. 
The farmer directs the boy’s gaze across the horizon to where 
Christminster ought to be, but reveals only its absence: 
“Christminster is out across there, by that clump. You can see 
it—at least you can on a clear day. Ah, no, you can’t now” 
(56). From here on, Christminster’s true form for Jude is not 
the narrow streets and crumbling masonry of an ancient city; it 
is a “mirage in the peculiar atmosphere” (57). Since 
Christminster does not exist except as an ephemera, Jude’s 
fantasy of becoming a part of it is effective a fantasy of non-
existence. To borrow Edelman’s figuration, Jude’s drive to 
attain nothing turns the fantasy inside out to reveal its seams 
(35). It brings him uncomfortably close (“uncomfortably” 
mainly for those around him) to the nothingness of the Real. 
It is not enough to say that, for Jude, Christminster is an 
empty sign—a signifier without a signified. Better to say it is a 
perforated sign—a signifier that cannot contain the nothingness 
of signification. Its incompletion seeps out, thereby calling into 
doubt the very possibility of completion. The nothingness of 
Christminster is sinthome par excellence in that it is 
“immediately permeated with enjoyment—that is, the 
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impossible junction of enjoyment with the signifier” (Žižek, 
Sublime 123). Because Jude’s fantasy is already perforated, it 
lacks the power to properly compel him towards the horizon. It 
makes no convincing promise of something in the future that is 
more than nothing. Whereas the normal fantasy looks to the 
future for self-propagation, the sinthomatic fantasy asserts 
itself “against futurity, against its propagation, insofar as it 
would designate an impasse in the passage to the future” 
(Edelman 33, italics in the original). Jude’s fantasy is a source 
of considerable discomfort for those around him, and must be 
regulated lest it impinge upon the comforting social fantasies 
that take haven in the promise of futurity. 
And here we arrive at my original assertion that both Jude’s 
scholarly and romantic pursuits must be policed, since they are 
but facets of the same antisocial fantasy. Once again 
borrowing from Edelman’s figuration, we might as well say 
they are facets of the same queer fantasy. Indeed, it is the 
inherent queerness of Jude’s primary fantasies—to become a 
Christminster scholar and, later, to maintain a connubial 
relationship with his cousin, Sue Bridehead—that society finds 
so intolerably threatening. Scholars have long noted the 
parallels between Jude’s relationship with Christminster and 
with Sue Bridehead. In his study of early drafts of Jude the 
Obscure, John Paterson finds a drift away from the novel’s 
initial focus on Christminster towards Jude’s destructive 
relationship with his cousin. He argues that Sue was originally 
intended to reflect Jude’s interest in Christminster (89). A 
decade later, Patricia Inham would contend the opposite, 
asserting that “Jude’s longing for Christminster is part of his 
longing for the unknown girl [Sue]” (167). Whichever side is to 
be believed, I am certain that Hardy had always envisioned a 
duality between the fantasies. Moreover, I suggest that the 
chicken-and-egg origins of Christminster and Sue are 
immaterial insofar as both are essentially different objets a of 
the same queer fantasy. As Edelman writes: 
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homosexuality, understood as a cultural figure, as the 
hypostatization of various fantasies that trench on the 
antisocial force that queerness might better name, is 
made—that is, both called forth and compelled—to carry 
the burden of sexuality’s demeaning relation to the 
sinthome, the burden of what Lacan describes as the 
absence of a sexual relation: the absence that is of a 
complimentarity to naturalize relations between the sexes 
insofar as all sexuality suffers from the mark of the 
signifier as lack. (Edelman 39) 
In other words, Jude’s relationships with both Christminster 
and Sue are marked with the stigma of queerness because 
both refuse to participate in the social fantasy of the sexual 
relationship—the fantasy that marriage is the coming together 
of two parts of a whole, uniting signifier and signified. 
The homosexual aspect of Jude’s fantasy is somewhat more 
obvious when it takes on the form of Christminster, an 
exclusively masculine space, which, for Jude, “subsumes the 
male/female dichotomy within the primal dichotomy of father 
and mother” (Harding 95). Christminster becomes dangerously 
hermaphroditic.2 The “men of old” (62), in whose company 
Jude dreams of belonging, simultaneously assume the role of 
Alma Mater, “Loving Mother” (74). Thus, the sexual relation 
collapses in on itself, and Christminster becomes a (non-)space 
which no longer demands, or even permits, an orientation 
towards the future. It is no wonder then that the moment in 
which Jude’s Christminster fantasy becomes properly 
hermaphroditic is the moment that the social aggressively 
intrudes upon it. Nor is it any wonder that the object of 
intrusion is the original embodiment of the Lacanian barre, 
“the characteristic part of a barrow-pig,” the phallus (Hardy 
                                               
2 “Hermaphroditic” reads “homosexual” in this instance in that, while 
Christminster is alternately figured as male or female, it is never male-
female. It lacks the complimentarity to which Edleman refers above. 
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74). As Harding asserts, Arabella’s missile serves as a means 
of castration in that it reveals to Jude the fetishistic nature of 
his Christminster fantasy: “The penis appears in the scene 
between Jude and Arabella because the penis is the latent 
signification of Christminster, and Christminster in turn 
functions as a fetishized substitute for the nonexistent 
maternal penis” (97). While I agree with the notion that 
Arabella’s phallus inserts itself as a fetish object, Harding 
erroneously bases his conclusion on the notion that 
Christminster is a “normal” fantasy—that, for Jude, the 
signifier-signified is already barred. Instead, I suggest that the 
phallus must be inserted at this moment precisely because 
Christminster is not a fetish. It does not offer Jude the 
impossible promise of psychic completion. Rather, as I have 
argued, it promises the opposite. 
The same principle holds true of Jude’s cousin. As with 
Christminster, Jude first conceives Sue as a phantom, never 
truly in the here and now. As he tells her, “you, Sue, are such 
a phantasmal, bodiless creature, one who—if you’ll allow me to 
say it—has so little animal passion in you, that you can act 
upon reason in the matter when we poor unfortunate wretches 
of grosser substance can’t” (290). He later says to her, “I have 
often said, you are absolutely the most ethereal, least sensual 
woman I ever knew to exist without inhuman sexlessness” 
(373). Of course, this repeated disavowal of Sue’s sexuality 
rings somewhat disingenuous, even before Jude admits to his 
carnal desire and coaxes her into bed; but at the same time, 
his sexual attraction to her is rooted in the same nothingness 
that draws him to Christminster. Though she is pretty, her real 
attraction for Jude lies in her “phantasmal,” “bodiless,” 
“ethereal” nature, as well as in the fact that their relationship 
is taboo. For Jude, it seems, the phantasmal and the antisocial 
are inseparable. Consider, for example, Jude’s initial 
experience with Sue, when he first gazes upon her photograph 
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(that he encounters her as a two-dimensional screen neatly 
underscores the fact of her being a fantasy projection): 
[Jude observed] the photograph of a pretty girlish face, in 
a broad hat, with radiating folds under the brim like the 
rays of a halo. He asked who she was. His grand-aunt 
gruffly replied that she was his cousin Sue Bridehead, of 
the inimical branch of the family. (112) 
Thus, Jude constructs his fantasy upon two features: first, that 
Sue is not quite of this world; second, that she is “inimical.” At 
least part of her allure resides in the fact that he should not 
have her; that, like Christminster, Sue is a deviant fantasy that 
demands social prohibition. 
The connubial joy, the perverse happiness that Jude derives 
from his non-marriage with Sue calls into question the illusion 
of futurity promised by a sanctioned marriage. The couple is 
dangerous because their unregulated sexuality paradoxically 
denies the promise of a sexual relationship. It does not defer; 
it does not “depend on the fantasy of its attainment to come” 
(Edelman 41, italics in the original). By its very proscription, 
their sexuality demonstrates the fundamental permeability of 
the Law. The perverse nature of Jude and Sue’s sexuality 
produces a surplus of jouissance that is eminently readable to 
those around them, which is why Jude and Sue are continually 
denied inclusion in any community—it is why, for example, 
their Christminster landlady intuitively suspects that they are 
not actually married (359). 
Society must police this excessive enjoyment, because a 
failure to do so threatens to unravel the signifying chain. The 
ideological structures constructed around the institution of 
marriage can only maintain themselves so long as the subject’s 
jouissance is held in check. Indeed, as Hardy demonstrates, 
Jude and Arabella are only legible as a married couple because 
they make each other miserable: 
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The landlord of the lodging, who had heard that they were 
a queer couple, had doubted if they were married at all, 
especially as he had seen Arabella kiss Jude one evening 
when she had taken a little cordial; and he was about to 
give them notice to quit, till by chance overhearing her 
one night haranguing Jude in rattling terms, and 
ultimately flinging a shoe at his head, he recognized the 
note of ordinary wedlock; and concluding that they must 
be respectable, said no more. (413) 
As the embodiment of the larger social (heterosexual) fantasy, 
Arabella’s function is to bring Jude in line. She must introduce 
normative objects of desire for Jude to construct a new fantasy 
around; she must initiate him into a “practical” fantasy that 
reifies the illusion of symbolic closure. In some ways, 
Arabella’s hard practicality is excusable, perhaps even 
admirable. As Eagleton notes, “Jude is sickened by Arabella’s 
pig-sticking, but her angry comment, ‘Poor folks must live,’ has 
a point and Jude must learn it” (38). Eagleton is right, of 
course, but Arabella’s simple statement of fact is dense with 
ideological implications: poor folks must live as poor folks. 
Poor folks must reproduce themselves in order to maintain the 
structure, if not the actuality, of society—the very society, 
incidentally, which demands they be poor. More importantly, 
they must continually defer to some imagined, but never seen, 
future in which the signifier and signified finally close. Only in 
this impossible future might they allow Jude’s queer fantasy to 
be fulfilled.  
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